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Analysis Of Some Post Soviet Countries 
And East Asian Countries 





Corruption is an important social and ethical problem. Determining root causes of it should be 
the first step to fight it. In this study, using a dynamic panel data approach, we try to determine 
the likely causes of level of corruption in some of the former USSR countries and East Asian 
countries. Regression results show that, past values of corruption and the level of political rights 
in a country are the factors that are most affecting the level of corruption in a country. Degree of 
opennes to the foreign trade, interference of government in the economy, FDI inflows, degree of 
civil liberties seem not to have significant effect on corruption level in a country. Level of 
inflation, unemployment, per capita GDP seems not to be among the causes of corruption, but 
rather they are “caused by the corruption”. There seems no significant differences between East 
Asian Countries and post-communist countries in terms of corruption level, when the effect of 
other variables are kept constant.  
 





orrption is an important social and ethical problem. It is a type of economic crime that exist in nearly all 
societies to a greater or lesser extent. There are many definitions of corruption in the literature. World 
Bank define corruption as : “the abuse of public office for private gain.” Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
define corruption as “the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain.” Although 
corruption is seen as a public sector problem, there can be corruption in private sector too. Usually there is a 
principal-agent relationship underlying corruption. A discretion is given through a contract by the principal to the 
agent, to behave in the name of the principal. If the agent, violating the contract, tries to get illegal benefit to the 
detriment of the principal, corruption occurs.  
 
There is nearly a consensus in the literature about that corruption is harmful for a society, it discourages 
investments, distorts income distribution, causes inefficiencies and the waste of resources and harms democracy and 
ethics. There a few studies arguing that there may be some benefits of corruption (like Porta & Vannucci (mentioned 
in Heywood, 1997), Leff (1964), Leys (1970), Lui (1985)) though. In these studies, the argument is that corruption 
can serve as an incentive payment speeding up bureaucracy, removing government imposed  inefficient rules, giving 
opportunity to those most valuing the time to get permissions faster by paying for it. However, these studies misses a 
point; usually heavy bureacracy is created by the bureaucrats to be able to obtain more bribes.  
 
On the otherhand, the literature on harmful effects of corruption is much wider. Many studies have shown 
that there is a negative relationship between corruption and investments and development level (Mauro (1995), 
Ahmad (2008), Le and Rishi (2006)). Mauro (1998) suggests that, political instability is greater in the countries 
where corruption is more widespread.  
 
There may be many factors that facilitate corruption, encourage people to engage in corrupt activities. In 
the literature, wage level of public employees is shown to be one of the important factors determining corruption 
C 
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level. If wage level of the public employees are below the survival level of a family, many employees think of 
closing the gap with corruption. High wages makes losing the job more undesirable so decreases corruption. As 
economy opens to foreign trade and the level of national income rises, corruption level is expected to decrease. In an 
open and rich country there are less presssure on redistribution. In low income countries people fight to share a 
constant perceived pie; as development level increases, production and productivity gets more important, hard work 
gets more valuation. Existence of rule of law, political freedoms, free media and democracy are important factors 
decreasing corruption. In non-democratic countries ruling class usually corrupts and since there is no free media to 
announce it or no opposition to question it, corruption gets more widespread. As education level of the people 
increase, level of corruption is expected to decrease. High inflation and high level of public expenditures are 
expected to rise corruption in a country by increasing rent seeking culture in the country. Quality of bureaucratic 
services and the justice system are also very important factors affecting the level of corruption in a country. Level of 
unemployment have ambiguous effect on corruption. On the one hand increasing unemployment may increase rent 
seeking behavior thus rises corruption; on the otherhand, high unemployment makes public officers more afraid of 
losing their jobs so decreases corruption.  
 
There are many empirical studies on the causes of corruption in the literature. Treisman (2000) using panel 
data of developed and developing countries, shows that the countries that are more developed and more open to 
foreign trade have less corruption. Although current leel of democracy in a couıntry is an significant factor affecting 
corruption, the countries who have a long history of democracy and rule of law have significantly lower levels of 
corruption.  
 
Pelligrini and Gerlah (2008), examining  cross sectional data of 107 countries, reach to the same conclusion 
with Treisman (2000) about the affect of democracy tradition on decreasing corruption. Pelligrini and Gerlah (2008) 
also find that political instability increases corruption and prevalance of the newspapers decreases it (by informing 
the people about corruption cases and thus serving as a way of discouragement for corrupt people). There is not a 
statistically significant relationship between the government intervention the economy and the corruption. 
 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) examining panel data of 31 countries between 1982-94, find a statitstically 
significant negative relationship in the long term between corruption and the ratio of public sector emploees’ wage 
level to the wage level of the employees in the private productive sectors. On the other hand, authors can not find a 
relationship between neither education and corruption nor gross domestic product per capita and corruption.   
 
Chand and Moene (1997), examine Gana Public Expenditure reform and show that the bonus program 
established for tax officals, increase in penalties and decrease in the general tax level caused much improvement in 
the ability of Gana government ot collect taxes. 
 
On the otherhand, Buscaglia (2001), for some Latin American countries, finds that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between wage levels of judges and corruption in the justice system.  
 
Tosun (2003), using data of 44 countries for the 1982-1995 finds that rule of law, quality of bureaucracy 
and (against expectations) public expenditures have decreasing effect on corruption. Level of inflation, national 
income growth, wage level of public employees seems not to have a statistically significant effect on corruption.  
 
Zakaria (2009) finds for Pakistan that openness to foreign trade decreases corruption. Moreover, corruption 
decreases with increasing education level, national income, political freedom and the decreasing level of 
government intervention in the economy.  
 
Broadman and Recanatini (2000) in their article examining 26 transition countries, show that greater 
market entry barriers, a less effective legal system, less competitive infrastructure services are associated with higher 
corruption. Increasing democracy has a decreasing effect on corruption while coefficient of the openness variable, is 
not statisticaly significant. The coefficients of GDP per capita is insignificant.  
 
Rauch and Evans (2000) collect survey data on various elements of bureaucratic structure for 35 countries. 
As a result of the regression analysis, authors found that per capita GDP is a significant determinant of corruption 
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and meritocratic recruitment and education each are significant in explaining one of the corruption measures. All 
three has decreasing effect on corruption. On the otherhand, the coefficients of career, salary and ethnic diversity 
measures are insignificant for both corruption measures.  
 
Goldsmith (1999), using a sample of 34 low and middle income countries, show that, per capita GNP has a 
strongly significant decreasing effect on corruption variable; increasing economic liberalization and increasing 
centralization of the state are also significant factors decreasing corruption. Although less significant than other 
variables, higher levels of political democratization is also associated with diminished corruption.    
 
Lee (1981) (mentioned in Berkman (1988)) examines the relationship between traditional values and 
tolerance for corruption and finds that those of the surveyed people whose traditionality points are higher tolerate 
corruption more and those with lower traditional bonds, tolerate corruption less. Results also show that, those who 
are comparatively older and less educated are more tolerant to corruption in comparison to the ones who are younger 
and more educated.  
 
In the article by Ades and Di Tella (1997) a number of  panel and cross-section regressions analysis are 
done and results in general show that more active industrial policy of government is significantly correlated with 
higher levels of corruption. Degree of political rights in the country has no significant effect on corruption and 
education level. Degree of openness to foreign trade and security level of the country have significantly negative 
relationships with the level of corruption.  
 
Laffont and Guesson (1999) empirically test the relationships between competitiveness and corruption on 
African data. Results of the regression show that openness variable (imports/GDP, which is assumed to show 
competitiveness) is a strongly significant factor decreasing corruption. Growth rate increase also decreases 
corruption. Foreign aid and illiteracy rate has a weakly significant increasing effect on corruption. When an 
interaction variable between the competition and corruption variables is introduced, it is shown that coefficient of 
the openness variable (imports (GDP)) is positive for high levels of corruption but negative for low-levels of it.  
 
Goel and Rich (1989), using US data, show that, probability of being convicted and severity of punishment 
are decreasing corruption. The policing variable has no significant effect. Raising salaries of public employees have 
decreasing effect on the level of corruption. Coefficient of unemployment variable is positive and significant, which 
may reflect a rise in bribe offers during recessions. Lastly, advertising variable is significant and positive, most 
probably due to the fact that an increase in the volume of advertising leads to greater corruption by raising individual 
rates of discount of future. 
 
Identifying root causes of a problem is the first important step towards sloving it. Aim of this study is, 
using a dynamic panel data approach, to estimate the factors that leads to corruption and determine relative 
importance of each in explaining the level of corruption in the countries studied. We make a comparison between 
some Post-Comminist countries and some East Asian countries in this respect. In the second part of the article data 
and analysis is explained. In the third part, regression results are printed and interpreted. In the fourth part, 
concluding remarks takes place.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data set consists of the 3 countries that have been established after the collapse of the Soviet Union: 
Russian Federation, Kazakhistan, Ukraine, and newly developing countries of East Asia  (in fact some of them are 
now within the classification of “developed countries”): China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan. Countries are selected according to data availability. Dynamic panel data analysis of these countries 
between 1999-2009 were done.  
 
Independent variable of the regresssion is the level of perceived corruption in these countries.  
 
In fact, exact measures of corruption are difficult to find. It has numerous types and is unobservable. So, 
corruption is measured by proxies. 
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World Bank defines four types of proxies to measure corruption: i) Net Asset Evaluation ii) Arrests and 
convictions iii) Survey methodology iv) Macroeconomic empirical studies. 
 
Berg (2001) classifies corruption measures into two: objective measures and subjective measures. 
Objective measures are quantifications based on verifiable information, most often used of which are number of 
corruption charges or the number of internet search engine hits on corruption in a particular country. Subjective 
measures are perception or experience based and composed of data collected from surveys or polls in which 
individuals are asked to assess the level of corruption. 
 
Most frequently used measures in both cross-country comparisons and empirical research are survey 
measures provided by various international institutions or private researchers.  
 
Institutions like Economic Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services Inc., Political & Economic Risk 
Consultancy, Institute for Management Development, World Bank, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Word Economic 
Forum, Freedom House, Transparency International provide surveys on corruption perception for a number of 
countries.  
 
A number of economists like Hall and Yogo, Kaufmann, Kraay and Ziodo-Laboton, Ades & Di Tella 
(mentioned in Jain, 2001), Helpman, Jones, Kaufmann & Schankerman, Neumann (mentioned in Berg (2001)) also 
provide perceptions based or experience based indicators of corruption for the countries investigated. 
 
In this study as dependent variable we use “Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)” of Transparency 
International (TI) as a proxy for corruption. CPI since 1995, ranks more than 180 countries in terms of their 
perceived level of corruption. While ranking, TI use 13 different opinion surveys done in these countries and expert 
assesments. An index is established based on survey results. Index varies betwen 0-10, 0 means that country is 
perceived to be highly corrupt, 10 means that country is perceived to have low levels of corruption. CPI is one of the 
most used corruption measure in the literature on corruption.  
 
As mentioned in many theoretical and empirical studies on corruption, degree of political rights and civil 
liberties in a country are important determinants of corruption. As political rights and civil liberties increase, 
corruption level is expected to decline. However, objective measures of such pllitical and social variables are 
difficult to obtain. Jain (2001) gives a list of proxies for these variables and the researchers providing data. In this 
study, political rights and civil liberties data published by “Freedom House” are used as proxies for these 
independent varibles. Freedom House rank countries in terms of their “freedom” measures since 1972. Freedom 
House asseses the state of freedom, political rights and civil liberties in 195 countries and 14 related and disputed 
territories and publishes yearly. Surveys are done and then processed by a team of regional experts and scholars. An 
index is established based on survey results. Numerical rating varies between 1-7; a rating of 1 indicating the highest 
degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Freedom House defines political rights and civil liberties as:  
 
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for 
distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and 
elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil 
liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy without interference from the state (Freedom House, 2010). 
 
“Political rights” and “civil liberties” are two of the independent variables in the regression. Other 
independent variables are mostly macroeconomic aggregates : per capita gross domestic product (purchasing power 
parity adjusted) (variable name PCGDPPP), unemployment rate (variable name UNEMP) , exports share in GDP 
(variable name: EXPORT), government budget expenditures as a share of GDP (varibale name BUDGET), 
consumer price inflation (variable name INFLA), inward FDI flow as a percentage of total fixed investments in the 
country (variable name : FDI) and to represent education level tertiatry education gross enrollment rate (variable 
name : EDUCATION) are taken. All variables except education variable were taken from Economist Intelligence 
Unit. Education variable were obtained from Worl Bank database. To be able to observe whether there are 
significant differences between former USSR countries and East Asian Countries, we defined USSR dummy, which 
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takes value of zero for East Asian Countries (expect China, since it is a country which has much similarities with 
former USSR countries in terms of former regime and regime change) and value of one for the former communist 
countries (variable name : USSRDum).  
 
To test stationarity of the variables in panel data, there are many tests offerred by various economists in the 
literature. Levin and Lin (1992, 1993), Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997), Maddala and Wu (1999),Kao (1999) and Quah 
(1994), Kao and Chiang (1998), Pedroni (1995, 1997), McCoskey and Kao (1998), Phillips and Moon (1999) are 
among these. 
In this regression, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Statistic, ADF-Fisher Chi-Square and PP-Fisher Chi-Square 
tests are preferred. Because these tests assumes that unit root process are not the same between cross sectional units; 
which is a more suitable assumption regarding that our data is composed of countries with very divergent 
characteristics. Moreover, these tests have better small sample properties than the others (for a review see Coşar 
(2002)).  
 
Regression is estimated using panel generalized method of moments. Cointegration between the variables 
are tested using residuals stationarity based tests. 
 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
 Unit root tests of all varibles are done for 3 different test methodology. When the test results do not agree on 
the rejection/non-rejection of null hypothesis, that of PP-Fisher Chi-Square test result is taken. Null hypothses is the 
existence of unit root. Results for the variables are given below: 
 
 
 Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat ADF - Fisher Chi-square PP - Fisher Chi-square 
Variable Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability 
Corruption -0.7142 0.2376 28.0319 0.1086 25.0085 0.2011 
d(Corruption) -2.1101 0.0174 36.9817 0.0118 86.8677 0.0000 
Civillib 0.2493 0.5984 6.7115 0.7524 6.3895 0.7815 
d(Civillib) -0.5396 0.2947 11.4429 0.3241 19.6388 0.0329 
d2(Civillib) -2.5022 0.0062 25.6930 0.0042 35.3017 0.0001 
Budget -0.4721 0.3184 33.6964 0.0283 13.0395 0.8757 
d(Budget) -2.0454 0.0204 37.9452 0.0090 70.1217 0.0000 
Education 0.7185 0.7638 17.3676 0.3622 19.9719 0.2215 
d(Education) -0.2404 0.4050 18.5530 0.1827 26.2476 0.0506 
d2(Education) -0.9639 0.1676 21.7925 0.0830 28.8164 0.0252 
Export 3.1825 0.9993 10.3302 0.9618 6.1109 0.9987 
d(Export) 0.4045 0.6571 15.7682 0.7309 31.6102 0.0476 
d2(Export) 0.2292 0.5906 26.8529 0.1395 53.3104 0.0001 
FDI -0.5403 0.2945 21.3948 0.3742 24.5511 0.2191 
d(FDI) -1.8211 0.0343 33.1979 0.0321 66.7865 0.0000 
Infla -1.6069 0.0540 36.0563 0.0151 86.3196 0.0000 
PCGDPPP 1.1894 0.8828 12.8341 0.8844 3.5040 1.0000 
d(PCGDPPP) -0.0063 0.4975 15.5695 0.7429 32.4093 0.0391 
d2(PCGDPPP) 2.4004 0.9918 4.7923 0.9998 32.7517 0.0359 
Polright 0.5350 0.7037 7.3525 0.8335 15.0427 0.2391 
d(Polright) -1.5254 0.0636 20.7146 0.0547 61.5788 0.0000 
Unemp -2.9312 0.0017 43.4678 0.0018 63.4343 0.0000 
 
 
  Test results suggest that, corruption, civil liberties, political rights, share of government expenditures in GDP, 
tertiary school gross enrollment rate, share of exports in GDP, inward FDI inflows, GDP per capita (purchasing 
power parity adjusted) variables are integrated to order one, so we used them in first differences. On the other hand, 
inflation and unemployment variables are stationary at their levels according to all three statistics. So we use that 
two variables in the equation without taking their differences.  
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 Since we use stationary variables in the regresssion (either stationary at levels or made stationary by taking 
first differences), we do not need to make panel co-integration tests. Regression results would not be spurious. The 
regression we estimate is represented as : 
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
( ) ( ( 1)) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
Corruption Corruption Civillib FDI Polright
PCGDPPP USSRDum Infla Unemp Budget Export
    
     
          
        
 
 
In all regressions education variable has a coefficient not statistically different from zero. Moreover, for 
some countries, for some years, education data is not available; thus including this data makes our panel unbalanced. 
So, we exclude this variable from the regresssion.  Initial regression results are printed below: 
 
 
Table 1 : Initial Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: D(CORRUPTION) 
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments 
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2009 
Cross-sections included: 10 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 80 
Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix 
Instrument list: D(CORRUPTION (-2)) D(CIVILLIB) D(FDI) 
        D(POLRIGHT) D(PCGDPPP) USSRDUM INFLA UNEMP 
        D(BUDGET) D(EXPORT) C 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) 0.947851 0.593827 1.596173 0.1150 
D(CIVILLIB) -0.101944 0.103044 -0.989322 0.3260 
D(FDI) -0.003335 0.002891 -1.153801 0.2526 
D(POLRIGHT) -0.211672 0.127903 -1.654949 0.1025 
D(PCGDPPP) 2.63E-05 4.32E-05 0.608273 0.5450 
USSRDUM -0.024795 0.077189 -0.321221 0.7490 
INFLA -0.001414 0.006134 -0.230514 0.8184 
UNEMP 0.010370 0.014468 0.716771 0.4759 
D(BUDGET) 0.032779 0.027603 1.187524 0.2391 
D(EXPORT) 0.000318 0.000488 0.651773 0.5167 
C -0.126865 0.133671 -0.949080 0.3459 
R-squared -0.650284 Mean dependent var 0.027500 
Adjusted R-squared -0.889455 S.D. dependent var 0.219306 
S.E. of regression 0.301452 Sum squared resid 6.270252 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.815621 J-statistic 8.40E-28 
Instrument rank 11.00000    
 
 
We estimated the equation using panel generalized method of moments. Since the lagged values of the 
dependent variable is correlated with error terms, instrumental variables must be used to get unbiased coefficient 
estimates. Independent variables except lagged values of the dependent variables served as instruments of 
themselves and two period lagged values of the dependent variable served as instrument of one period lagged values 
of dependent variable; that is AR(1) term in the regresssion.  
 
To check whether there are any feedback effects from the dependent variable to independent variables, we 
have done granger causality tests and we have seen that, except for the unemployment and inflation variables, in non 
of the variables, there is a causation running from corruption to the independent variables at the %5 significance 
level. Feedback effect is also significant at %5,7 level for GDP per capita variable. That is, it seems that, corruption 
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Table 2: Granger Causality Test Results 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  INFLA does not Granger Cause CORRUPTION 90 0.14887 0.86190 
  CORRUPTION does not Granger Cause INFLA  3.87512  0.02451 
    
  PCGDPPP does not Granger Cause CORRUPTION 90 0.08267 0.92073 
  CORRUPTION does not Granger Cause PCGDPPP 2.95684 0.05735 
    
  UNEMP does not Granger Cause CORRUPTION 90 0.14914 0.86168 
  CORRUPTION does not Granger Cause UNEMP 4.43725 0.01469 
 
 
Granger causality test show no indication of the causation from either unemployment, inflation or per 
capita GDP to corruption. Moreover, coefficients of all three variables are not significant in our initial regression 
and due to feed back effects, they are correlated with the error term and thus makes the coeffient estimates biased. 
So we remove them from the regression. When we remove these variables, all of the other variables are integrated to 
order one, thus, we can use theirs levels instead of differences and test whether there is a cointegration between 
them. For the lagged values of the dependent variable we use two period lagged values as instruments and the other 
independent variables serve as instruments of themselves.  
 
 
Table 3 : The Second Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: CORRUPTION 
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009 
Cross-sections included: 10 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 100 
Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix 
Instrument list: CORRUPTION (-2) CIVILLIB FDI POLRIGHT 
        USSRDUM BUDGET EXPORT C 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
CORRUPTION(-1) 1.037398 0.025142 41.26108 0.0000 
CIVILLIB 0.095950 0.061041 1.571898 0.1194 
FDI -0.001068 0.002179 -0.490091 0.6252 
POLRIGHT -0.113353 0.057982 -1.954984 0.0536 
USSRDUM 0.196161 0.143467 1.367295 0.1749 
BUDGET -0.002297 0.006115 -0.375569 0.7081 
EXPORT 1.89E-05 0.000116 0.162456 0.8713 
C -0.055642 0.179861 -0.309360 0.7577 
R-squared 0.984879 Mean dependent var 4.057000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.983729 S.D. dependent var 2.141851 
S.E. of regression 0.273214 Sum squared resid 6.867411 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.096985 J-statistic 4.31E-21 
Instrument rank 8.000000    
 
 
From the regression results, it is seen that, degree of opennes to the foreign trade (measured by the share of 
exports in GDP), presence of government in the economy (measured by the share of government budget 
expenditures in GDP), inward FDI flows as a share of GDP, degree of civil liberties are factors that do not have 
significant effect on corruption level in a country. Dummy variable also has an insignificant coefficient, showing 
that there are no significant differences between East Asian Countries and post-communist countries in terms of  
corruption, when the effect of other variables are kept constant. Insignificance of the coefficient of the dummy 
variable does not change when we define dummy as taking value of one only for 3 former USSR countries.  
 
From the regresssion results, seems that, the only significant factors (at %5 significance level) that can 
affect corruption are the past values of corruption and the level of political rights in a country. Corruption shows 
path dependence, past year’s value of it is one of the most powerful determinants of the level of today’s corruption.  
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In line with the expectations, as the situation of the political rights worsens in a country, corruption level 
rises (remember, the rise of value of corruption index means less corruption and the decline of value of political 
rights index means more rights). Residuals of the regression are stationary according to Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
Statistic, ADF-Fisher Chi-Square and PP-Fisher Chi-Square unit root tests, so we can say that, there is cointegration 
between the variables. Test results are given below: 
 
 
Table 4 : Unit Root Tests of the Residuals 
  Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat ADF - Fisher Chi-square PP - Fisher Chi-square 
 Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability 
Residuals -2. 474 0.016 37.539 0.010 95.796 0.000 
 
 
There is an opinion in the literature that, the cointegration tests based on the stationarity of the residuals are 
biased towards accepting the existence of cointegration. Pedroni (1995, 1997) shows that problems like lack of 
exogeneity of the regressors and the dependency of the residuals on the distribution of the estimated coefficients 
causes biases in the cointegration tests based on testing the stationarity of the residuals. However, as we have shown 
above, our regression do not have these properties; thus we can trust the unit root tests of the residuals to comment 




 Corruption is an important social and ethical problem. Determining root causes of it should be the first step to 
be able to fight it. There is a large literature on the causes of corruption.  
 
Wage level of public employees, level of national income, degree of openness to foreign trade, existence of 
rule of law, political freedoms, free media and democracy, education level of the people, inflation, quality of 
bureaucratic services and the justice system, level of unemployment are some of the factors that are shown to affect 
corruption in some way or another.   
 
In this study, using a dynamic panel data approach, we try to determine the likely causes of level of 
corruption in some of the former USSR countries and East Asian countries. Regression results show that, past values 
of corruption and the level of political rights in a country are the factors that are most affecting the level of 
corruption in a country. Degree of opennes to the foreign trade, interference of government in the economy, FDI 
inflows, degree of civil liberties seem not to have significant effect on corruption level in a country. Level of 
inflation, unemployment, per capita GDP seems not among the causes of corruption, but rather they are “caused by 
the corruption”. There seems no significant differences between East Asian Countries and post-communist countries 
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